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AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Missions, Survivability, Size, Cost, Numbers
John F. Lehman, with Steven Wills
 The aircraft carrier, as employed by the United States and other nations, has been controversial since its operational introduction just over a century ago, 
with the commissioning of HMS Argus into the Royal Navy on 16 September 
1918.1 At that time and ever since, the carrier has faced intense criticism from 
rival services and political opponents. The arguments have not changed in that 
whole time. Critics believe carriers to be too expensive and too vulnerable. These 
arguments are raised anew in times of peace—then in every war the carrier’s de-
cisive use in combat ends the discussion for the next decade or so.
In 1949, the Truman administration ordered the decommissioning of all 
but seven of the Navy’s carriers and the dismantling of the first supercarrier, 
USS United States, then under construction. The outraged Secretary of the 
Navy (SECNAV), John L. Sullivan, who was not even consulted, resigned im-
mediately in protest.2 In what followed, known as the “Revolt of the Admirals,” 
many admirals and captains lobbied and testified against the administration, 
and many were fired as a result. Led by the future Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, the Navy fought against efforts by Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Louis A. Johnson and Air Force Secretary W. Stuart 
Symington to go even further: giving the Air Force all Navy and Marine avia-
tion. Burke survived an attempt to retire him as a captain, but the Navy’s future 
carrier programs seemed at best to be navigating in shoal water at the end of 
the 1940s.3
However, the Navy’s flattops soon got a chance to prove their worth in the 
emerging Cold War world. Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson provided to Con-
gress a survey of vital American interests in the Pacific that excluded Korea. That 
exclusion, combined with the dramatic disarmament of the U.S. Navy, provided 
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an irresistible temptation to the Soviet Union and China, and on 25 June 1950 
North Korea attacked South Korea. That, of course, brought about a sudden 
and complete end to the Truman administration’s naval disarmament. Since 
the invasion captured all air force bases in South Korea, carrier-based aviation, 
in the form of strike groups from USS Valley Forge (CV 45) and its Royal Navy 
counterpart in the western Pacific, HMS Triumph, went into action against North 
Korean forces on 3 July 1950—providing the only available tactical air support to 
the fight. Eighty-six U.S. and forty British carrier aircraft provided the primary 
air component of United Nations forces opposing the North Korean offensive. 
Carriers quickly proved their worth, and—with no more than four fleet carri-
ers ever deployed to Korea—the Navy flew 276,000 combat sorties (only seven 
thousand short of its total for World War II) and dropped 177,000 tons of bombs 
(74,000 tons more than the service had dropped in all of World War II) during 
the conflict.4
President Harry S. Truman sent an emergency bill to Congress trebling the de-
fense budget and canceling the retirement of aircraft carriers, and a few months 
later he fired Johnson as SECDEF. The House Armed Services Committee and 
its chairman, Representative Carl Vinson (D-GA), hailed the value of carrier 
aviation, and the first supercarrier, USS Forrestal (CV 59), was authorized in July 
1951.5 The dramatic role that carrier air played in Korea ended criticism of flat-
tops for the next twenty years.
President Truman and his successors often had occasion to utter the words 
“Where is the nearest carrier?” I myself first heard the question—more like a 
demand—from President Richard M. Nixon on 15 April 1969, when I worked for 
Henry A. Kissinger, then the assistant to the president for national security affairs 
(i.e., national security advisor).6 That day North Korea shot down a Navy EC-121 
reconnaissance plane over international waters, killing thirty-one sailors.7 There 
was no carrier in the theater, and we did nothing.
The election of Jimmy Carter to the U.S. presidency in 1976 started a new 
carrier battle less than two years later—with the same, now sixty-year-old, ar-
guments. President Carter, a former submariner, was opposed to building any 
more fleet carriers, and he intended to phase them out of the naval order of 
battle. Congress, however, added another two-billion-dollar Nimitz-class carrier 
to the president’s 1978 budget. In an unprecedented move, Carter vetoed the 
fiscal year 1979 (FY-79) defense bill because it included the carrier. However, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian takeover of the U.S. embassy 
soon after settled the issue. With the effort augmented by the presence in the 
Navy Senate office of Captain (and future U.S. senator) John S. McCain III, 
the fourth Nimitz carrier was authorized by Congress and signed into law by 
President Carter.8
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It was not long after the passage of this legislation that I, as the new SECNAV, 
had the keen pleasure of naming that carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71). 
The contract also became the first that I signed under the new, competitive, fixed-
price-procurement philosophy of the Reagan administration. (Roosevelt came in 
early and under budget.)9
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION:  
HIGH-WATER MARK OF THE CARRIER FORCE
The U.S. Navy reached a high point of fifteen carriers and 594 total ships in 1987, 
a growth of 74 ships from the end of the Carter administration owing to the 600-
Ship Navy initiative spearheaded by President Ronald W. Reagan. Two-carrier 
block buys—a process in which multiple ships of a single class are purchased 
in one year, yielding significant cost savings—were executed in the FY-83 and 
FY-88 budgets.10 This feat had not been accomplished with fleet carriers since 
the Second World War. The development of the six-hundred-ship force came 
directly from the specific requirements to carry out the new Forward Maritime 
Strategy—the ultimate realization of the Reagan administration’s determination 
to achieve unquestioned command of the seas.11
The Navy lost no time in carrying out the new strategy. Seven months after 
Reagan’s inauguration, eighty-three ships, including four carriers (two supercar-
riers, one vertical and/or short takeoff and landing [i.e., V/STOL] carrier, and 
one helicopter carrier), hidden by sophisticated cover-and-deception technology, 
raced north into the Norwegian Sea. The first the Soviets knew they were there 
was when USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) sent four F-14s, four A-6s, and 
four KA-6 tankers one thousand miles to fly at 550 knots through a Soviet exer-
cise thirteen miles off Murmansk.12 The Soviets were flabbergasted and never re-
ally recovered their previous confidence in their ability to defend their homeland 
from U.S. naval attack.
Every year thereafter, U.S.-led allied fleets carried out realistic training ex-
ercises in those seas—seas where they would fight if the Soviets attacked. Each 
exercise refined and improved tactics that incorporated the newest technology. 
By 1985, the carriers were operating in Norwegian fjords and among Norwegian 
Sea archipelagoes, making enemy targeting next to impossible.13
Soviet chief of the General Staff Marshal Sergey F. Akhromeyev visited the 
United States in July 1988 as part of Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s desire 
to reduce tensions with the West. Akhromeyev flew out to the carrier Theodore 
Roosevelt and observed a demonstration of the carrier air wing’s capabilities. 
During the visit, Akhromeyev presented a global map to U.S. Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. that incorporated symbols 
detailing a ring of American naval bases and deployed submarines and aircraft 
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carriers surrounding the Eurasian continent, and specifically the Soviet home-
land. Akhromeyev told Crowe, “Your navy and bases surround my country and 
threaten the security of the Soviet Union.”14 The union of the Forward Maritime 
Strategy and the six-hundred-ship Navy was the core of the Reagan administra-
tion’s military and naval rearmament plans that were crucial to deterrence—and 
ultimately to victory in the Cold War.
The Soviet Navy and Air Force came to realize that they could not cope. In 
1986, the Soviet General Staff sent a démarche to the Politburo, urgently request-
ing a tripling of the budgets 
for the Northern Fleet and 
Northern Air Force; other-
wise, they believed that in the 
event of war they could not 
defend the country’s northern 
flank for more than a week. This hit the Politburo like a thunderclap and was a 
major factor contributing to the Soviet collapse.15
As occurred after previous conflicts, Cold War victory brought an overreac-
tion in disarmament. The fleet was reduced by one-third, with the number of 
carriers cut from fifteen to twelve.16
CARRIERS: MISSIONS AND COSTS
To build the force of fifteen carriers in the ’80s, we froze the design of the Nimitz 
class and built five more of them on fixed-price contracts that varied only in the 
steady introduction of ever-improving weapons technology.17 However, passage 
of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in 1986 took decisions on new weapons away 
from the services, transferring them to the significantly enlarged Department of 
Defense (DoD) bureaucracy.18 Under this new joint system, it was decided that 
the Navy should have a new carrier design.19
Given the Ford’s exorbitant and still-growing price tag, many have advocated 
a return to smaller carriers. We will examine such options later in this article.
The new administration of President Donald J. Trump called for an increase 
in the fleet to 355 ships, including twelve aircraft carriers. The FY-17 budget spe-
cifically required the Navy to maintain at least eleven aircraft carriers and nine 
carrier air wings, and the same legislation endorsed the 355-ship, twelve-carrier 
goals.20
Yet challenges to these goals have continued. There was a dip to ten carriers 
in December 2012 when Enterprise was retired, and, surprisingly, the Trump De-
fense Department requested only five new combatant ships and two tugboats in 
the FY-21 budget.21 Presidents now often must be disappointed when in a crisis 
they ask, “Where are the carriers?”
Critics believe carriers to be too expensive and 
too vulnerable . . . in times of peace—then in 
every war the carrier’s decisive use in combat 
ends the discussion for the next decade or so.
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The F-18Es and the F-35s are all effective fleet-air-defense fighters. The con-
tinuously upgraded Aegis antiair system is now the standard for USN cruisers and 
destroyers (and soon for the FFG-62 frigate) that serve as the carrier’s partners in 
providing air superiority. While these surface combatants are highly effective in 
shooting down enemy aircraft and ballistic, supersonic, and hypersonic missiles, 
they and the Army transports, tankers, merchant ships, and amphibious-warfare 
vessels they escort cannot survive for long without air cover; they must have 
fighter cover twenty-four hours a day. The majority of the earth’s surface is out 
of range for land-based fighters, so they cannot provide the around-the-clock 
coverage needed. Only carrier air wings can provide that capability.
As was the case in the 1970s and ’80s with the rise of the Soviet Navy, there is 
no lack of operational-level-of-war missions for the individual carrier strike group 
and the multiflattop carrier battle force in the new age of great-power competition. 
The emergence of a Chinese carrier force—now consisting of three vessels, with 
the potential for up to six by the 2030s—suggests the potential for carrier duels in 
blue water that may be reminiscent of the great Pacific War of the 1940s.22
CARRIER STATISTICS SINCE 1942
Sources: Lehman, Aircraft Carriers: The Real Choices, p. 8; Eric Wertheim, The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, 
and Systems, 16th–19th eds. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013–); Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers: A History of Carrier Aviation and Its Influence 
on World Events, vol. 2, 1946–2006, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2008).











Cost When  
Purchased  
(2019 dollars)
Essex 1942 27,100 872 147 3,170 $68–$78 million  
($1 billion)
Midway 1945 45,000 968 136 3,960 $85.6 million in 1945 
($1.2 billion)
Forrestal 1955 60,000 1,039 252 4,100 $217 million in 1952 
($3.13 billion)
Kitty Hawk 1961 64,000 1,072 252 4,600 $400 million in 1961 
($3.4 billion)
Enterprise 1961 75,000 1,125 252 4,600 $451 million in 1960 
($4.11 billion)








2014 44,971 844 108 1,200 $3.4 billion in 2014 dollars
Ford 2017 100,000 1,106 256 4,660 $13.3 billion in 2017  
(still rising)
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Like during the Cold War under the 1980s Maritime Strategy, the carrier’s first 
mission might be warfare at sea against enemy surface, subsurface, and aviation 
units. For example, attriting Chinese surface and air forces could enhance the 
implementation of guerre de course (targeting Chinese global commerce) and 
could include sea-based aviation strikes against Chinese infrastructure and ports, 
mining of ports and sea-lanes, and the closing of straits to Chinese merchant and 
naval shipping. Carrier-based aviation enforcing blockades likely would serve as 
the backbone of global horizontal-escalation operations against overseas Chinese 
military and commercial installations. Such a capability greatly strengthens de-
terrence, as University of Pennsylvania scholar Fiona Cunningham suggests: “[A] 
blockade would cripple China’s economy, deny its leaders access to key resources 
needed to fight the war, and ultimately compel its leaders to negotiate an end to 
the conflict. Like deep strikes on the Chinese mainland, the prospect of a block-
ade could deter China from starting a conflict.”23
The Russian Federation Navy represents a mere shadow of the former Soviet 
fleet, but it possesses modern submarines and missiles that can threaten Western 
targets afloat and ashore.24 What is similar to the Cold War situation is that the 
Russian General Staff greatly fears the power of a U.S. “aerospace blitzkrieg,” led 
MAXIMUM MISSILE RANGES IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT
Source: U.S. Defense Dept., Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018 (Washington, 
DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018).
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in large part by carrier-based aircraft and their weapons.25 Russia’s strategic geog-
raphy is even worse than that of its Soviet predecessor state. Russian naval forces 
remain divided by vast geographic distances, often spanning areas that are de-
void of useful land bases for aircraft, yet much of Russia’s long-range response to 
sea-based aviation is dependent on land-based systems and relies on significant 
aerospace control that might not be possible in the presence of U.S. carriers.26 
U.S. naval carrier-based aviation is very useful in bridging and controlling such 
distances, and it would contribute the largest part of any aerospace campaign 
against the Russian Northern and Pacific Fleets.
The continuing acquisition of carriers by China—and by Australia, France, 
Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and now South Korea—demonstrates that the 
flattop remains a vital component of diplomacy, power projection ashore, and 
operational warfare at sea.27
AIRCRAFT CARRIER SURVIVABILITY
While all surface vessels are susceptible to attack, the vulnerability of the carrier 
to multiple new weapons—including the hypersonic cruise missile, the antiship 
ballistic missile, and an arsenal of other arms that includes submarine torpedoes, 
mines, and drones—again is at the center of the debate on the large carrier’s 
continued viability.
Yet consider the examples of carrier survivability provided below.
World War II–Era Kamikaze Attacks
In an unexpected attack by a Japanese kamikaze (i.e., suicide-attack) plane on 
30 October 1944, USS Franklin (CV 13) was hit with a 550-pound bomb. It pen-
etrated the ship’s unarmored flight deck and exploded, igniting dozens of other 
weapons on the aircraft parked on the ship’s hangar deck.28 Less than six months 
later, on 19 March 1945, Franklin was hit again, this time by two five-hundred-
pound bombs from Japanese attackers. Franklin suffered almost eight hundred 
dead out of 2,600 personnel aboard at the time of the attack.29 The Franklin 
battle-damage report later stated, “The conflagration in Franklin resulting from 
the action of 19 March was the most severe survived by any U.S. warship during 
the course of World War II. It is pertinent, however, to point out that the result-
ing damage would not in itself have caused the loss of the ship since the principal 
strength structure, watertight integrity and vital machinery below the hangar 
deck remained intact.”30
The official USN damage report highlights the robust design and survivability 
of the large flattop in action. The report does acknowledge that the “major dam-
age sustained in each of the actions of 30 October 1944 and 19 March 1945 dem-
onstrates the effectiveness of bomb hits when received by aircraft carriers during 
the extremely vulnerable period just prior to and during periods of launching 
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strikes.” However, the Franklin report then goes on to state, “The latter two cases 
of damage to Franklin illustrate thoroughly the ability of modern U.S. aircraft 
carriers to survive extensive damage from plane crashes, fire, and heavy bombs.” 
Large carriers can survive heavy damage and remain afloat, if not operational. 
When Franklin’s fires finally were brought under control, the ship resumed 
steaming under its own power.31 The damage to Franklin was important, in that 
it helped set new design parameters for post–World War II flattops (beginning 
with USS Midway [CV 41]) that emphasized armor and other forms of improved 
protection for the carrier.32
During the Okinawa campaign, the Japanese launched an estimated 
1,900 kamikaze sorties against the Allied fleet.33 Of the 793 kamikazes that 
actually found targets, 181 hit 
ships and another ninety-five 
crashed close enough to cause 
damage. Most of these aircraft 
were very agile fighters using 
very effective tactics, often 
making them superior in 
performance to modern anti-
ship missiles. During 1945, six large carriers were hit by these kamikazes, and 
another six by bombers using kamikaze tactics. None of the ships were sunk or 
damaged beyond repair.34
Vietnam-Era Accidents: Oriskany, Forrestal, and Enterprise
The lessons learned from Franklin and other World War II carriers influenced 
the design of subsequent Cold War flattops, with positive results. Three cases 
in particular emphasize the survivability of the big carrier across the Cold War.
USS Oriskany (CV 34), USS Forrestal (CV 59), and USS Enterprise (CVN 65) 
all experienced exploding bombs and severe fires that killed many sailors. Yet all 
returned to port for repairs under their own power. Enterprise later was assessed 
to have survived the equivalent of six heavyweight Soviet cruise-missile strikes in 
the course of its accident, but could have resumed air operations in several hours 
had repair capacity not been immediately available.35
USS America Testing
The former Kitty Hawk–class flattop USS America (CV 66) was the subject of four 
weeks of extensive survivability testing (referred to as a SINKEX) in May 2005.36 
The tests were designed to support the development of the future large nuclear 
carriers.37 America, with its double hull and more than a thousand watertight 
compartments, stubbornly resisted sinking; in the end, sending it to the bottom 
required deliberately opening the scuttles.38 Granted, a controlled SINKEX is not 
Army transports, tankers, merchant ships, and 
amphibious-warfare vessels . . . cannot survive 
for long without air cover. . . . The majority 
of the earth’s surface is out of range for land-
based fighters, so [o]nly carrier air wings can 
provide that capability.
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a combat test, but it does suggest that the current Nimitz- and Ford-class carri-
ers—which were built as improved versions of America—incorporate superior 
survivability.
Bonhomme Richard Fire
USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) was a large amphibious-warfare ship much like 
an aircraft carrier. In July 2020, it was moored at Naval Station San Diego, Cali-
fornia. The ship was undergoing upgrades to allow it to operate F-35B Lightning 
aircraft, as one of the so-called Lightning carriers, such as the most recent USS 
America (LHA 6), a similar large, amphibious warship that recently deployed 
with thirteen F-35B Marine Corps Lightning aircraft.39
Bonhomme Richard then underwent an unintended test of aviation-ship sur-
vivability. On 12 July 2020, the ship suffered a fire that resulted in severe damage. 
It affected eleven of the ship’s fourteen decks, buckled segments of the flight deck, 
damaged the vehicle storage area, and gutted the command-and-control spaces 
located in the ship’s island. The damage was so severe that Bonhomme Richard 
was declared beyond economical repair.40
The blaze demonstrates the vulnerability of large amphibious ships that act as 
light carriers. While ships such as Bonhomme Richard and America look like air-
craft carriers, and in fact are larger than World War II–era flattops such as Frank-
lin, they are not built to the same survivability standard as are full-size carriers.41 
They have little armor; more important, they incorporate little compartmenta-
tion, having large, open spaces that include well decks for landing craft and large 
storage parks for vehicles as key components of their mission to transport and 
land Marines. These characteristics add to the overall vulnerability of amphibious 
ships compared with purpose-built aircraft carriers.
OPTIONS FOR CARRIER SIZE
There are infinite varieties of potential carrier designs. For purposes of this ar-
ticle, it is useful to reduce that variety to three general sizes for consideration.
The Ford-Class CVN
The current Ford-class carrier is in serial production, with a planning goal of 
at least six ships. This was the first carrier designed under the post-Goldwater-
Nichols joint-bureaucratic process. While Ford has essentially the same hull as 
USS Nimitz (CVN 68), changes from Nimitz to Ford originated with Navy par-
ticipation but without the Navy having final decision authority. Many of those 
twenty-three changes were based on undeveloped technologies and have been 
the source of billions of dollars in cost overruns and years of delay.42 They include 
engineering challenges with the electromagnetic catapults (EMALS), advanced 
arrestor gear, and elevators.
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Ford also has been unable, so far, to meet the contracted rate of 160 sorties per 
day.43 The Ford catapult system in particular has not been able yet to match the 
Nimitz sortie-generation capability, which approached 130 sorties per day during 
the initial part of the 2003 Iraq war. But that raises a more fundamental question: 
Is there any need for a higher number of sorties than Nimitz flattops can provide? 
The requirement for a higher number came from a joint requirement committee 
that based it on the old Vietnam War–era Alpha strike, or “aluminum cloud,” 
operation—which no longer is conducted.44
A more serious, as yet unsolved problem that goes beyond mere reliability is 
that if one electromagnetic catapult goes down, all go down. The FY-20 Direc-
tor of Operational Test and Evaluation annual report stated, “[T]he crew cannot 
readily electrically isolate EMALS components during flight operations due to 
the shared nature of the Energy Storage Groups and Power Conversion Sub-
system inverters on board CVN 78 [Ford]. The process for electrically isolating 
equipment is time-consuming; spinning down the EMALS motor/generators 
takes 1.5 hours by itself. This inability precludes EMALS high power mainte-
nance during flight operations.”45
These new, unproven technologies mandated by the joint bureaucracy have 
caused delays that have increased the cost of the first unit to $13.3 billion so 
far. This represents an increase of over $3.3 billion from original estimates—to 
double the cost of the last Nimitz.46
The Ford class, like the Nimitz, can be built in only one shipyard, effectively 
making Newport News Shipbuilding a monopoly. This makes it difficult to ob-
tain innovation or cost savings in construction.
A New Midway-Size CVM
The Midway-class carriers of the immediate post–World War II era were de-
veloped to incorporate all the lessons from the Pacific War. Midway went on 
to serve a forty-six-year career, from 1945 through the 1991 Gulf War. Midway 
was roughly two-thirds the size of Nimitz. While a new Midway-size carrier 
would operate fewer aircraft than Nimitz/Ford vessels, its catapult and arrested-
landing configuration would allow it to operate all current and planned U.S. naval 
aircraft.
Changes in the oil-supply situation, including the U.S. transition from net oil 
importer to exporter, as well as lower prices, would make a new, conventionally 
powered, 65,000-ton carrier much less costly to build and operate than a Ford-
class flattop. There are several options for proven, low-risk, conventional propul-
sion systems, ranging from diesels through gas turbines to combined diesel and 
gas-turbine (CODAG) systems. Nuclear power also is an option, especially using 
existing, proven submarine power plants. A modern Midway-size carrier would 
offer 368,000 square feet of weapons storage and 1.48 million gallons of aviation 
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fuel—not as much as a Nimitz/Ford platform, but enough to support more than 
eighty sorties per day and at least a week of sustained operations.47
A future Midway-size carrier would incorporate all the survivability features 
of the CVNs. These would include extensive watertight compartmentation and 
lighter-weight yet much more effective side protection than heavy belt armor, 
and would incorporate advanced firefighting capability employing the latest 
technology.
LHD/LHA Lightning Carrier
Other platforms often mentioned as candidates to serve as light carriers, or to 
augment the current carrier force, are the ships of the U.S. “big deck” amphibi-
ous force. It consists of Wasp-class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) and the new 
America-class landing helicopter assault ships (LHAs).
The eight ships of the Wasp (LHD 1) class and the current three Americas are 
amphibious-warfare ships designed for helicopter assault and well-deck-based 
landing operations with embarked U.S. Marines or other ground forces. Weigh-
ing in at over 45,000 tons and stretching almost 850 feet in length, they are nearly 
the size of the original Midway when it commissioned in 1945.48
These ships’ size and aircraft carrier–like flight decks have allowed them to 
operate the AV-8B Harrier II ground-attack aircraft for decades—in a second-
ary role, as an air/ground-attack element of Marine Corps amphibious, and later 
expeditionary, forces. An earlier LHA-class ship, Nassau (LHA 4), acted as a 
carrier during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, and later the small force of six 
Harriers aboard Kearsarge (LHD 3) played an outsize role in 2011’s Operation 
ODYSSEY DAWN against Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s Libyan forces. As noted earlier, 
America recently deployed with thirteen F-35Bs embarked to test the Lightning 
carrier concept.49
Yet while these ships are large and carrier-like in many ways, they are built to 
a much lower standard of survivability than conventional flattops and are much 
slower, with a best speed of twenty-four knots. The fire on and subsequent deci-
sion to scrap Bonhomme Richard further suggest that the big-deck amphibious 
ship is not a viable carrier design.
NUCLEAR VERSUS CONVENTIONAL PROPULSION:  
COST AND RELATED FACTORS
The U.S. Navy has not built a nonnuclear-powered aircraft carrier since the first 
USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) was commissioned in 1968. The last conventionally 
powered carrier, USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), was decommissioned in 2009.
However, Congress has dropped earlier legislation mandating that all carriers 
be nuclear propelled.50 Another issue that was not appreciated fully in the late 
1970s is that of nuclear carrier defueling and ultimate disposal.
12
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Nonetheless, the U.S. Navy has been committed to nuclear propulsion for 
aircraft carriers. Yet apart from the operational advantages of nuclear power, 
there are significant cost differentials compared with conventional options. Some 
quick illustrations follow: 
• Acquisition: The current estimated cost of a nuclear plant producing 280,000 
shaft horsepower is $9.7 billion.51 The Navy has not analyzed the current 
estimated cost of a conventional plant producing the same horsepower using 
the latest technology, but it likely would be significantly less than that of the 
nuclear plant.
• Refueling (as part of a regular refueling complex overhaul [RCOH]): The 
cost for a nuclear carrier is $678 million.52
• Defueling: Current cost estimates for defueling and recycling a nuclear 
carrier at retirement range from $750 million to $1.5 billion (depending on 
whether a military or commercial shipyard is used).53
• Fueling: The Navy has not calculated the current estimated annual cost of 
fueling a conventional carrier with modern diesel, gas-turbine, or CODAG 
propulsion at today’s fuel prices.
• Lost availability: An RCOH takes two years, whereas conventional flattops 
have no comparable loss of operational availability. 
A General Accounting Office study in 1998 put the operating cost differential 
at about 10 percent in favor of conventional propulsion. The Navy believed that 
nuclear propulsion offered 10 percent more in terms of operational advantages, 
most notably in terms of fossil fuel costs.54
Since those studies were conducted, two things have changed. First, technology 
has increased vastly the availability of fossil fuel in the United States; its effective 
average cost today is a small fraction of what it was in the 1990s. Another signifi-
cant difference is that now there is only one (monopoly) shipbuilder for supercar-
riers, leading to the runaway costs of the Ford-class carrier. In the words of a 2017 
RAND study, “[C]ontinuing the Ford-class carrier program imposes high acquisi-
tion cost and might unduly affect the whole of the Navy shipbuilding budget.”55
Other problems, with Ford’s electromagnetic catapults and arresting gear 
and new radar systems, have delayed the ship’s first deployment further. The 
follow-on units to Ford also have continued to see cost increases. Cost estimates 
for Newport News Shipbuilding to design and construct John F. Kennedy have 
increased by $3.58 billion so far.56
The aircraft carrier has been the single most expensive platform in the U.S. 
military ever since World War II, but the cost of the Ford class is out of proportion 
to that of any of its predecessors. There are several reasons for this. It is the first 
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carrier procurement managed by the joint Pentagon bureaucracy established by 
the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of the 1980s, rather than by the Navy itself. Joint 
Requirements Oversight Committee inputs added twelve undeveloped technolo-
gies to the design, including electromagnetic catapults, arresting gear, and eleva-
tors, along with new radars and other fundamental elements of the ship’s infra-
structure—none of which existed at the time of the contract, and some of which 
have not been completed or tested successfully even at this writing.57 Some skep-
tics have described the Ford 
carrier as a seagoing camel 
(camel: a horse designed by 
a committee). The ship was 
authorized in FY-08. Now, 
thirteen years later, the cost so 
far, in 2008 dollars, is over $14 
billion—and still climbing, since not all of its systems have been fully certified.58 
By contrast, the first ship of the Nimitz class (roughly the same size as Ford) took 
nine years from contract (1967) to deployment (1976) and cost $4 billion in 2008 
dollars, adjusted for inflation. (Nimitz cost about $1 billion in 1975 dollars.)59
Required maintenance also restricts carrier availability. Even a dozen super-
carriers cannot meet the demands from the regional combatant commanders 
(COCOMs). The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 gave COCOMs the authority 
to issue demand signals for forces, and in effect force the Navy to provide more 
carriers for their operations, even when it means the ships forgo required main-
tenance and their crews’ required training.60
REQUIRED NUMBERS
The Korean War demonstrated a calculus that has remained consistent to the 
present day. For every deployed flattop, the Navy must possess three: the first 
carrier on station; the second in the shipyard undergoing refit; and the third in 
the training cycle, preparing to deploy.
Since the 1970s, carrier deployments have been concentrated in three hubs: 
the Mediterranean Sea, the western Pacific Ocean, and the Arabian Sea. The force 
requirements to maintain combat-credible power in those regions have played a 
prominent role in determining both the numbers of carriers needed and the size 
of the rest of the fleet.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, the number of 
flattops required declined to twelve. The hope was that a dozen carriers could 
provide the appropriate global deterrent, perform Middle East war-fighting mis-
sions, and conduct presence operations in at least one other deployment region, 
as stipulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review document.61
COCOMs—not surprisingly—prefer to hold 
on to naval forces for as long as they can. 
These regional demands are being met at the 
cost of grinding down the ships and sailors.
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The Navy has tried to stretch the eleven-carrier force to cover the demands 
of the COCOMS; however, the Navy has learned—and relearned the hard way—
that the service cannot do more with less. The tried-and-true system of three 
carriers in rotation, intended to keep one forward-deployed, was able—in the 
emergency circumstances of wartime—to provide instead two out of the three; 
but that cannot be maintained in peacetime without severe damage to retention, 
maintenance, and readiness. That is where we are today. The Navy needs more 
ships.
Recent deployment lengths suggest this shortage is not going away. In January 
2020, the carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) set a dubious record in making a 
yearlong deployment—the longest of any flattop since the Vietnam War.62 Dwight 
D. Eisenhower and Theodore Roosevelt made nine-month deployments in 2020.63 
George H. W. Bush (CVN 77) has completed a nine-month deployment, Carl 
Vinson (CVN 70) completed a 9.5-month deployment, and Theodore Roosevelt 
will complete an 8.5-month deployment in 2021.64 Despite strenuous efforts 
by a succession of SECNAVs and CNOs to reduce the length of carrier deploy-
ments, they have failed. Since the Goldwater-Nichols reforms of 1987, the CNO 
has no authority over the ships once they deploy in response to a request from a 
COCOM, and COCOMs—not surprisingly—prefer to hold on to naval forces for 
as long as they can. These regional demands are being met at the cost of grinding 
down the ships and sailors. Again: The Navy does not have enough ships.
The last Trump administration SECDEF, Mark T. Esper, did not support add-
ing carriers to the fleet. He suggested that as few as eight carriers and no more 
than eleven were needed. He called for replacing them with alternative force 
structures, including unmanned surface and subsurface units.65 These hopes are 
naive; many of the notional low-end platforms suggested as carrier replacements, 
and the logistics needed to support a large number of such units in a distributed 
deployment, simply do not exist.
The Navy cannot afford the time needed to travel—again—down the road 
of troubled joint ship classes when a rapid expansion of fleet capability is sorely 
needed now.
AN ELEVEN-CARRIER NAVY IN A FIFTEEN-CARRIER WORLD
The immediate post–World War II U.S. Navy and its Cold War successor embod-
ied a mix of capabilities in both high- and low-end units. Both navies, however, 
were built around carriers, as combat from the 1940s to the 1980s Falklands War 
proved that surface combatants cannot operate in the absence of sea-based air 
superiority. The carrier is not the only USN offensive platform that can strike 
targets ashore; other surface ships and submarines provide significant capability 
in terms of missile firepower. However, the carrier is the only platform that can 
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provide a mobile dome of 24/7 air superiority over the 71 percent of the earth’s 
surface covered by seawater. Carriers exist to protect the missile shooters as much 
as to conduct strikes themselves. Even distributed, low-end missile shooters, 
manned or unmanned, will require air superiority. And naval or other military 
supply ships, commercial tankers, transports—none of these can survive on the 
surface of the sea without air superiority above them.
The current great-power competition is playing out in at least three major 
geographic areas. Given the Chinese navy’s growth and hostile intent, the geog-
raphy of the Indo-Pacific—containing few and limited land bases—is a matter of 
particular concern.
Considering the current and increasing commitments of U.S. naval forces to 
multiple deployment hubs, the corrosive strain those deployments have placed on 
the current carrier fleet, the absence of any suitable alternative platform or sys-
tem, and the lack of any available replacements for our current carriers, it is ur-
gent that we build a larger carrier fleet than the present eleven- or twelve-flattop 
force. An increased level of sea-based aviation is of paramount importance, so 
more aircraft carriers are needed. However, they need not all be nuclear-powered 
supercarriers.
Factors
This article confirms the irreplaceable value of sea-based aviation as provided by 
the aircraft carrier, and it tees up the choices regarding that platform. A robust 
carrier force is required if the U.S. Navy is to do its part in assuring allies and 
partners of its credibility to deter and, if necessary, compel opponents to cease 
hostile actions and support war termination on terms favorable to the United 
States, its allies, and partners.
The following summarized principles apply.
Missions. The missions for airpower at sea in the third decade of the twenty-first 
century remain robust and varied as the Navy returns to great-power competition 
with China and Russia. As noted above, the Indo-Pacific region, and the Arctic 
as well, offers few locations for land-based aviation. Regions more familiar from 
recent U.S. combat action, such as the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf, do 
offer provisions for land-based aviation, but shifting political climates can limit 
access, and improved ballistic- and cruise-missile technologies threaten all fixed 
installations.
These geographic and political issues suggest that carrier-based aviation will 
remain a vital component of U.S. joint-force action in forward locations not only 
at the beginning of but throughout any sustained conflict. The carrier and its 
embarked aircraft are agile in their missions and can shift at short notice from 
performing sea control to power projection ashore to humanitarian-service 
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operations. The need for robust airpower at sea will remain a constant for the 
near future.
Survivability. No surface warship is more survivable than the large aircraft car-
rier. Dispersal of forces among smaller flattops might reduce susceptibility to at-
tack, but any flattop smaller than fifty thousand tons displacement will be more 
vulnerable to and less able to recover from damage.
The return to active competition with the Soviet Navy in the 1980s (after a 
focus on air strikes ashore in Vietnam) led to innovations in operations that 
reduced carrier vulnerability. The new Chinese and returning Russian threats 
likewise will spur a return to a more aggressive carrier posture at sea, with more 
deception operations to reduce vulnerability.66
Just as threats have increased, so have the carrier’s defenses. These come in 
the form of attack-submarine escorts, antisubmarine helicopters, and constantly 
improving technology in its Aegis escorts.
Finally, if carriers are attacked successfully, the accidents of the 1960s and the 
recent SINKEX of the ex–USS America suggest that large carriers can survive 
tremendous punishment. The recent Bonhomme Richard fire tells us, however, 
that ships not purpose-built as 
fleet carriers may suffer cata-
strophic failure even in cases 
of moderate damage, and 
they lack the ability of larger 
flattops to return to flight 
operations after taking heavy 
damage. Amphibious-warfare 
ships such as Bonhomme Richard can support Marine aviation in a ground-
support role and might serve as auxiliary carriers in low-threat regions, but they 
cannot pretend to be fleet carriers.
Numbers. How many carriers does the U.S. Navy need to carry out its global 
operations? Adversaries may change but geography does not, and analyses from 
diverse periods (the 1980s, 1993 [the Bottom-Up Review], and 2015) suggest that 
the U.S. Navy needs at least fifteen carriers to cover three deployment hubs effec-
tively without prematurely exhausting both the ships themselves and the sailors 
who crew them.67 Actual wartime operations likely would require more flattops.
Cruise missiles launched by surface ships are an important component of na-
val power, but it would take dozens of those ships—as well as a currently nonex-
istent rearming and resupply force to keep enough of them at sea—to serve as an 
effective deterrent or a sustained strike capability. Even then, they would require 
an escorting carrier to protect them from aerial attack.
A new, twenty-first-century design of the size 
of . . . USS Midway and supporting an air 
wing of sixty to sixty-five aircraft could serve 
as a complement to the larger nuclear flattops 
while still incorporating rugged survivability 
and being capable of independent operations.
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Cost. The Ford class is too expensive for it to be the ship that increases the carrier 
fleet. A smaller, conventionally powered flattop that is large enough to support a 
sixty-five-plane air wing would take advantage of the new U.S. status as a net oil 
provider to operate at a lower cost than can a nuclear flattop.
Above all, a carrier of this size can be built competitively—in multiple yards, by 
more than one builder—and that competition will improve innovation and drive 
down costs. Restoring competition in the defense marketplace, for both ideas and 
products, is essential if we are to regain control of the current runaway costs.
Choices
The Navy needs fully capable, nuclear-powered carriers. The Nimitz class rep-
resents one such option, but half of the operational lifespan of those vessels is 
already behind them.
The Ford class, encumbered with immature technologies and a rising price tag, 
cannot be the only carrier solution going forward into the next decade. Increas-
ing threats from peer competitors and regional powers demand a mix of carrier 
capabilities.
The existing USN big-deck amphibious warships—LHDs of the Wasp class 
and LHAs of the America class—have been adapted as Lightning carriers, em-
barking upward of two F-35 squadrons. However, they are too slow, they lack 
survivability, and in the absence of catapults they cannot support the vital early-
warning and electronic-warfare aircraft crucial to the success of the strike/air-
defense aircraft.
A new, twenty-first-century design of the size of the very successful USS 
Midway and supporting an air wing of sixty to sixty-five aircraft could serve 
as a complement to the larger nuclear flattops while still incorporating rugged 
survivability and being capable of independent operations. Such a ship could be 
designed and built in far less time than Ford, could be built competitively in more 
than one shipyard, and would cost far less. Even if, for industrial-base reasons, 
such a ship were nuclear powered, it might use reactors already developed for 
our submarine fleet.
The aircraft carrier’s roles and missions have remained controversial in the 
hundred years since its introduction to world navies. Critics have declared that 
carriers could not survive bombs from dirigibles, battleship guns, dive-bombers, 
kamikazes, submarine torpedoes, cruise missiles, sea-skimming supersonic mis-
siles, ballistic missiles, and hypersonic missiles.68 Yet in the age-old seesaw of 
offense versus defense, carrier critics consistently have been proved wrong.
Since World War II, the U.S. Navy has faced existential questions concern-
ing the future of the flattop on three distinct occasions (in 1949, during the late 
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1970s, and during the early 1990s), in addition to the current debate over carrier 
choices. All those debates eventually were resolved in favor of the carrier’s con-
tinued role in naval operations. It remains clear that the aircraft carrier should 
continue as the centerpiece of USN combat power. Submarine- and surface-
launched missiles are indeed important components of naval combat power, but 
they cannot replace the carrier.
The authors believe that the ships presented here constitute a complete set 
of practical candidates. Unending debate about and continued drift among the 
carrier choices presented by the executive and legislative branches, as well as 
the Navy itself, will result only in further erosion of naval capability, and thus 
national security.
In our judgment, the best choice is the Midway-size CVM carrier. It would be 
big enough to carry a full, three-dimensional air wing; could make speeds well 
above thirty knots; would deploy the highest-technology, close-in, electronic, 
cyber, and kinetic defenses; and would enjoy all the survivability of the Nimitz 
and Ford classes, not only owing to size but by incorporating multiple hulls, 
armored decks and side protection, full watertight compartmentation, and the 
latest firefighting technology. Finally, such a carrier would be small enough to be 
built in at least four American shipyards at a competitive price, at a fraction of 
what the Ford class costs.
The Navy—not a joint or multiservice committee—should design and procure 
this ship, and then the Navy must be held accountable. It is time to make a choice 
and proceed to construction.
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